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PLEADING PRINCIPLES AND
PROBLEMS IN WASHINGTON
Philip A. Trautman*
It has now been a little over two decades since the present rules govern-
ing pleading became effective in Washington. ' It was on January 1, 1960
that the pertinent Washington Civil Rules, patterned after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, took effect.2 With some twenty years of experi-
ence to draw upon, it seems appropriate to review that experience with
the hope of embellishing the stark provisions of the rules themselves,
clarifying some of the problems that have arisen, and evaluating whether
the objectives sought in the rules have been achieved. 3
Perhaps the most commonly stated objective of the present pleading
rules was to simplify the pleading stage of litigation. 4 In place of the tech-
nical fact-oriented approach of code pleading, the emphasis was to be
upon notifying the opponent and the court in a general way of one's posi-
tion and of the issues. 5 The more detailed presentation and revelation of
facts and issues was to be left for the pre-trial devices such as discovery,
summary judgment procedures and pre-trial conferences. It cannot be too
often or too firmly stressed that the evaluation of modern rule pleading
must include an awareness of those pre-trial devices. 6
The objective of simplifying pleadings is achieved in part by authoriz-
ing and requiring few pleadings. 7 In the ordinary lawsuit there is only the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1952, J.D., 1954, University of Washing-
ton.
I. The principal rules of consequence are WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 7-12 & 15.
2. The present rules relating to joinder of claims and parties became effective at the same time.
They are discussed in Trautman, Joinder of Claims and Parties in Washington, 14 GONZ. L. REV.
103 (1978).
3. Professor Robert Meisenholder anticipated many of the problems and provided guidance in
two valuable articles which preceded the effective date of the rules. Meisenholder, The Effect of
Proposed Rules 7 Through 25 on Present Washington Procedures, 32 WASH. L. REV. 219 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Meisenholder I]; Meisenholder, The Effect of Proposed Rules 7 Through 25 on
Present Washington Procedures: Part 11, 32 WASH. L. REV. 336 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Meisen-
holder II]. See also R. MEISENHOLDER, COMMENTARIES ON NEW WASHINGTON RULES OF PLEADING,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1959).
4. The objectives are summarized in Meisenholder I, supra note 3, at 220.
5. There has been some dissent from the asserted merits of general notice pleading. See L. OR-
LAND & D. REAUGH, 9 WASHINGTON PRACTICE x-xi (1971).
6. The devices are discussed in Trautman, Discovery in Washington. 47 WASH. L. REV. 409
(1972) and Trautman, Motions for Summary Judgment: Their Use and Effect in Washington, 45
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
7. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 7(a) lists the allowable pleadings.
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complaint and answer. 8 A reply is required only in the event of a counter-
claim denominated as such or in the unlikely instance that the court other-
wise orders a reply. In addition, if the answer contains a cross-claim
under Civil Rule 13, there may be an answer to such cross-claim. Finally,
if a third-party complaint is served under Rule 14, there may be a third-
party answer.
In essence, pleading under the rules is a two-stage affair with respect to
each claim in the great majority of instances. There is a complaint and
answer, a counterclaim and reply (in effect an answer), a cross-claim and
answer, and a third-party complaint and third-party answer. No other
pleading is permitted except if the court orders a reply to an answer or a
third-party answer.
The other general change made by the rules as to the type of pleading
was the abolishment of demurrers, pleas and exceptions for insufficiency
of pleadings. 9 Of these the most important was the demurrer. In its place
is the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which is discussed in
detail later.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING
The party seeking relief must set forth a claim for relief whether it be
the original claim, a counterclaim, a cross-claim or a third-party claim.
This is to consist of a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief and a demand for judgment for the relief to
which the pleader is entitled. 10 This statement of a claim replaces the
code-pleading requirement that the complaint state facts constituting a
cause of action.11 Instead of a detailed recitation of the ultimate facts
upon which the claim is based, the pleader is to give fair notice to the
court and the opponent of the general nature of the claim asserted and the
ground upon which it rests. 12
The stated claim is to be viewed liberally in favor of the pleader. Con-
sequently, a complaint is not to be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
8. Under WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 81 (a), statutes applicable to special proceedings may spec-
ify that other pleadings be used. In accordance therewith, Snyder v. Cox, I Wn. App. 457. 462 P.2d
573 (1969), held that a plaintiff in a garnishment action must file an affidavit controverting the gar-
nishee's answer.
9. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 7(c). An early, soundly reasoned case discussing the effect of the
abolishment was Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn. 2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961).
The abolishment was not retroactive. McDowell v. Burke, 57 Wn. 2d 794, 359 P.2d 1037 (1961).
10. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(a).
11. Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co., 58 Wn. 2d 659, 364 P.2d 804 (1961).
12. Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wn. 2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960).
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in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. 13 More defini-
tive guidelines of when this is and is not accomplished will be developed
in the later discussion of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
As indicated, a claim for relief is to include a demand for judgment for
the relief to which the pleader deems himself entitled. A statute adopted
in 197614 significantly affects the manner in which the relief desired may
be stated. Thereunder, in a civil action for personal injuries, the com-
plaint is not to contain a statement of the damages sought but instead a
prayer for damages as shall be determined. The defendant may request a
statement setting forth separately the amounts of any special and general
damages sought, and the plaintiff is then to make service of such a state-
ment within fifteen days after service of the request.
A question that arises under the statute is whether the failure of the
plaintiff originally to comply, as by stating the damages claimed in the
complaint, provides a basis for recovery by the defendant. In McNeal v.
Allen 15 the plaintiff sought damages in the stated amount of $500,000 in a
medical malpractice action. The defendants asserted in a counterclaim
that the allegation of damages violated the statute thereby entitling the
defendants to recover. The defendants also filed a "third-party com-
plaint" against the plaintiff's attorneys based upon the same allega-
tions. 16 The trial court dismissed these pleadings by the defendants and at
the same time struck the stated amount of damages from the complaint. In
a seven to two opinion, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed. The
majority treated the defendants' claim as one for injury to reputation and
held the allegedly libelous statements to be absolutely privileged. The
court suggested that violations of the statute could be curbed by striking
the improper allegations from the pleadings and, if necessary, by repri-
manding, fining and punishing the plaintiff's attorneys.
13. Callahan v. Keystone Fireworks Mfg. Co., 72 Wn. 2d 823, 435 P.2d 626 (1967) (allegation
of negligence and failure to warn sufficient); Scharf v. Harstad, 61 Wn. 2d 188, 377 P.2d 416 (1963)
(failure to allege causal relationship not fatal); Lightner v. Balow, 59 Wn. 2d 856, 370 P.2d 982
(1962) (allegation broad enough to allow evidence that city was acting in proprietary capacity); Chris-
tensen v. Swedish Hosp., 59 Wn. 2d 545, 368 P.2d 897 (1962) (allegation of malicious threat to refer
matter to prosecuting attorney sufficient); Seattle Professional Photographers Ags'n v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 9 Wn. App. 656, 513 P.2d 840 (1973) (allegation of sales of photographic products as
"loss leaders" sufficient). See also Silver Surprize, Inc. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 74 Wn. 2d 519,
445 P.2d 334 (1968) (subject-matterjurisdiction dependent on nature of claim and relief sought as set
forth in complaint).
14. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.28.360 (1979).
15. 95 Vn. 2d 265,621 P.2d 1285 (1980).
16. It appears that labeling the claim against the attorneys as a third-party proceeding under Civil
Rule 14 was incorrect as the defendants were not asserting that the attorneys were liable to the defen-
dants for the claim by the plaintiff against the defendants. Instead the attorneys should have been
joined as parties to the counterclaim under Civil Rule 13(h).
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Washington Law Review Vol. 56:687, 1981
The relief sought in any proceeding may be in the alternative or of dif-
ferent types. 17 In the event relief is sought in the alternative, the plaintiff
has no basis to complain if he is awarded the lesser relief desired. Thus,
where the plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract and prayed for
damages or "such other and different judgment in law and in equity" as
appropriate, the plaintiff had no basis for reversal of a judgment which
permitted the defendant to specifically perform. 18
Even if alternative relief is not demanded, the plaintiff is not restricted
to the relief requested. To the contrary, a judgment should grant the relief
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled. 19 The excep-
tion is a judgment by default, which is not to be different in kind or ex-
ceed the amount prayed for in the pleadings.2 0 The reason for the excep-
tion is that the defaulting party might have appeared had the party known
the award was to be different from, or greater than, that requested.
Adopting the present rule relating to the general form of denials did not
substantially change the earlier practice in Washington and no particular
problems appear to have arisen. 2 1 The expectation is that the defendant
will admit and deny the averments of the adverse party with particularity
and, when appropriate, will deny only parts of an averment and specify so
much as is true. 22 Ordinarily, the denials will be specific in nature. In the
unusual circumstance wherein the defendant can in good faith controvert
17. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(a).
18. Baylor v. Municipality of Metropolitan Seattle, 75 Wn. 2d 710,453 P.2d 829 (1969).
19. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 54(c). The principle applies to the award of attorneys' fees. Hos
Bros. Bulldozing, Inc. v. Hugh S. Ferguson Co., 8 Wn. App. 769, 508 P.2d 1377 (1973). See also
Interstate Hosts, Inc. v. Airport Concessions, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 487, 429 P.2d 245 (l967): Mazon v.
Druxman, 68 Wn. 2d 701, 415 P.2d 86 (1966); Lester v. Percy, 58 Wn. 2d 501. 364 P.2d 423 (196 1)
(excellent discussion by Foster, J., concurring).
20. Davis v. Bafus, 3 Wn. App. 164, 473 P.2d 192 (1970). A footnote by the court in the recent
case of McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn. 2d 265, 266 n.t, 621 P.2d 1285, 1286 n.l (1980). creates some
confusion. The court said:
It is not disputed that the statement of the amount of damages claimed was inadvertent. Prior
to the enactment of RCW 4.28.360, the amount of the claim properly was included in the com-
plaint, both under statute (RCW 4.32.040(3)) and court rule (CR 8(a)). This practice was
deemed necessary to give notice to the defendant, and because of the rule that the judgment may
not exceed the amount claimed in the complaint, unless the claim has been amended before the
case has been submitted. See McKelvie v. Hackney, 58 Wn. 2d 23, 360 P.2d 746 (1961)Y Ware
v. Phillips, 77 Wn. 2d 879, 468 P.2d 444 (1970). Whether, under RCW 4.28.360, that rule has
been abrogated in personal injury actions, is a question not presently before the court.
To the extent the quotation suggests that the "rule" generally governs, the statement seems errone-
ous. The McKelvie case states the Washington position prior to adoption of Civil Rule 54(c). The
Ware case involved a default and while it contained dicta that a judgment may not exceed the demand
of the complaint, even in the absence of a default, it cited as authority cases representing the pre-Civil
Rule 54(c) doctrine.
21. See Meisenholder I. supra note 3, at 234-35.
22. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(b).
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all the averments of the adversary, a general denial is permissible. 23 Also
permissible, and more likely justifiable, is a statement by the defendant
that he is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as
to the truth of an averment. Such a statement has the effect of a denial.
All denials are subject to the obligations set forth in Civil Rule 11, dis-
cussed later.
While the provisions relating to denials have generated little case law,
the contrary has been true as to affirmative defenses. The purpose in re-
quiring that certain defenses be pleaded affirmatively is to avoid surpris-
ing the adversary. 24 The thought is that, as to those defenses, the adver-
sary would be surprised if evidence were admissible simply on the basis
of a denial.
To provide some guidance to the defendant as to what is to be pleaded,
Civil Rule 8(c) lists nineteen affirmative defenses. The designated de-
fenses which "shall" be pleaded affirmatively are accord and satisfac-
tion, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res
judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations and waiver. In determin-
ing whether a designated defense has been pleaded, the court presumably
will interpret the pleading liberally in favor of the pleader. 25
If, despite a liberal construction, a designated defense is not pleaded,
evidence in support of that defense will not be admitted. For example,
several cases have held that a failure to plead estoppel or waiver precludes
considering those defenses. 26 It is to be noted that this duty to plead
waiver relates to defenses. It does not impose a duty on the plaintiff to
plead matters in anticipation of their being raised affirmatively by the de-
fendant. 27
Of the other designated defenses, those which seem to have been most
often lost as a result of a failure to plead are contributory (and now, per-
23. A general denial verified only by the party's attorney, who lacked personal knowledge of the
facts denied, was not sufficient to meet an affidavit of the adversary in a summary judgment proceed-
ing. Carlson v. Milbrad, 68 Wn. 2d 847,415 P.2d 1020 (1966).
24. Mahoney v. Tingley, 85 Wn. 2d 95,529 P.2d 1068 (1975).
25. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Pearson, 63 Wn. 2d 890, 389 P.2d 665 (1964) (defendant's af-
firmative defense of fraud interpreted to encompass theory of failure of consideration; however, evi-
dence did not support theory).
26. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Miller, 87 Wn. 2d 70, 549 P.2d 9 (1976); Fiorito v. M. A. Segale, Inc.,
18 Wn. App. 158, 566 P.2d 1268 (1977); Bonanza Real Estate v. Crouch, 10 Wn. App. 380, 517
P.2d 1371 (1974).
27. Clover Park School Dist. No. 400 v. Consolidated Dairy Prods. Co., 15 Wn. App. 429, 550
P.2d 47 (1976) (plaintiff not obligated under Civil Rule 8(c) to plead waiver of a right to rescind by
defendant).
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haps, comparative) negligence, 28 res judicata, 29 and the running of a stat-
ute of limitations. 30 This most often creates a problem for the defendant
when evidence of the defense is excluded or there is a refusal to instruct
the jury on the defense. 31
In addition to the nineteen specifically designated defenses, Civil Rule
8(c) requires pleading "any other matter constituting an avoidance or af-
firmative defense." This has been construed to mean any matter that does
not merely controvert the plaintiff's prima facie case, or that injects an
issue not raised by the plaintiff's pleading, or that is directed at avoiding
rather than destroying the plaintiff's case. 32 The effect of such an ap-
proach is not self-evident and is best appreciated by noting some results.
It has been held that the following constitute affirmative defenses: insuffi-
cient service of process, 33 revocation of acceptance of a product, 34 ultra
vires, 35 and abandonment in an action for forcible entry and detainer. 36
Probably the safest approach for the defendant when in doubt is to plead a
matter affirmatively rather than take the chance that the issue can be
raised under a denial.
By pleading affirmatively the defendant avoids the possibility of waiv-
ing the particular defense. It is also possible, of course, that in adopting
this approach, a defendant will thereby plead something which would
have been available simply with a denial. A conceivable tactical disad-
vantage in this is that a defense may be highlighted which otherwise
might not readily appear until the trial, thereby causing the defendant to
lose the element of surprise. Balanced against this are the factors of the
propriety of such tactics, the likelihood that the defense will become ap-
parent during discovery in any event, the benefit gained as a result of
28. Boley v. Larson, 69 Wn. 2d 621, 419 P.2d 579 (1966); Golub v. Mantopli, 65 Wn. 2d 361.
397 P.2d 433 (1964); Hughey v. Winthrop Motor Co., 61 Wn. 2d 227. 377 P.2d 640 (1963): Liesey
v. Wheeler, 60 Wn. 2d 209, 373 P.2d 130 (1962).
29. Meder v. CCME Corp., 7 Wn. App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252 (1972); Banchero v. City Council.
2 Wn. App. 519, 468 P.2d 724 (1970).
30. Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wn. App. 864, 515 P.2d 995 (1973). Cf. Matthies v. Knodel. 19 Wn
App. 1, 573 P.2d 1332 (1977) (notice of appearance by defendant held not to have constituted waiver
of defense of statute of limitations which was thereafter pleaded in the answer).
31. Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607,547 P.2d 1221 (1976).
32. Shinn Irrigation Equip., Inc. v. Marchand, I Wn. App. 428, 462 P.2d 571 (1969) (in an
action upon an open account for goods delivered, a defense that the charges therefor were subject to
an oral agreement had to be pleaded and could not be supported under a denial).
33. Raymond v. Fleming, 24 Wn. App. 112, 600 P.2d 614 (1979). The defense may also be
raised by motion under WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 12(b)(5).
34. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Sygitowicz, 18 Wn. App. 658, 571 P.2d 224 (1977).
35. Rutcosky v. Tracy, 89 Wn. 2d 606, 574 P.2d 382 (1978); Chappel v. Franklin Pierce School
Dist. No. 402, 71 Wn. 2d 17, 426 P.2d 471 (1967) (dicta).
36. Tuschoffv Westover, 65 Wn. 2d 69, 395 P.2d 630(1964).
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emphasizing the defense, and, again, the avoidance of waiver of the de-
fense should one guess wrongly.
Another conceivable disadvantage is the possibility that the defendant
will be deemed to have assumed the burden of proving an allegation
which the defendant has unnecessarily affirmatively pleaded. Courts dif-
fer on this issue, but an early Washington case held that the pleading of an
affirmative defense which added nothing to a denial should not itself re-
sult in incurring the burden of proof.37 No cases in point have been found
since the adoption of the present pleading rules, but presumably the early
authority continues to control. If anything, the present policy of avoiding
decisions based on the technicalities of pleading should strengthen the
likelihood of a similar result.
The necessity of affirmatively pleading certain matters may in a few
instances result in some issues being pleaded twice. An excellent illustra-
tion arises when the issue is one of whether payment has been made on a
contract. A plaintiff suing for breach of contract because of nonpayment
by the defendant must allege the nonpayment to state a claim. Presum-
ably, the defendant must affirmatively allege payment since it is specifi-
cally listed in Civil Rule 8(c), rather than simply relying upon a denial of
the plaintiff's allegation. 38 Certainly this is the safer course for the defen-
dant to take to assure that there is no waiver, with the result, as stated,
that the issue will be pleaded twice.
In all this one must keep in mind that the purpose of requiring affirma-
tive pleading in the designated instances is to avoid surprising the adver-
sary. As with most modem procedural rules, the requirement is to be read
with an allowance for flexibility and not with absoluteness. A failure to
plead affirmatively should be considered harmless if it does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. If the issue is litigated or argued without
objection to the failure to affirmatively plead it, the failure to comply with
the rule should be deemed waived. 39
This flexible approach is supported by a related provision in Civil Rule
8(c). If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim or a
37. Schmitz v. Mathews, 133 Wash. 335, 233 P. 660 (1925), held that the defendant's affirma-
tive pleading, to a complaint for money loaned, that the money was paid for stock sold, added noth-
ing to a general denial and should not have resulted in an instruction that the defendant had the burden
of proof on the issue. See also Nissen v. Obde, 55 Wn. 2d 527, 348 P.2d 421 (1960), in which the
affirmative pleading of bad faith did not result in the incurrence of the burden of proof on that issue.
38. West Coast Credit Corp. v. Pedersen, 64 Wn. 2d 33, 390 P.2d 551 (1964), left open the
question whether in such circumstances it was necessary to specially allege payment as an affirmative
defense, though in the particular case, there had been such an affirmative allegation. The court did
hold that the defendant had the burden to prove payment since it is comparatively easier for the
defendant to prove he has paid than for the plaintiff to prove nonpayment, a negative.
39. Mahoney v. Tingley, 85 Wn. 2d 95, 529 P.2d 1068 (1975); Hughes v. Gibbs, 55 Wn. 2d
791,350 P.2d 475 (1960).
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counterclaim as a defense, the court is directed to accomplish justice
rather than rigorously enforce conformance. Thus, the pleading is to be
treated as if there had been a proper designation.
Flexibility does not, of course, justify the complete absence of a re-
sponse to a claim. A failure to respond, for example, to averments in a
complaint (or comparable claim) when such is required results in an ad-
mission of such averments. 40 On the other hand, when no response is
required or permitted, averments in a pleading are taken as denied or
avoided. 41 An example is an affirmative defense which is deemed denied
without the necessity of a reply, unless the court orders otherwise.
The general approach to be taken to the drafting of a pleading is set
forth in Civil Rule 8(e). No technical form is required, but each averment
should be simple, concise and direct. The pleader may set forth alternate,
hypothetical or inconsistent claims or defenses. This includes alternate
statements of facts and of legal theories to support a claim or a defense. It
matters not whether such statements are included in one count or defense
or in separate counts or defenses. Further, when alternative statements are
made and one of them is sufficient, the pleading is not ineffective because
of any insufficiency in the other statements. 42
Alternate, hypothetical and inconsistent pleading is allowed to avoid
forcing the pleader to assert a position too early in the process when the
pleader is not yet sure what facts may develop and what legal theories
may be relevant. This can better be determined after discovery, pre-trial
proceedings, and even trial have been completed. So long as the adver-
sary receives general notice of the position of the pleader, the purpose of
the pleading has been accomplished. Consequently, if at the beginning
the pleader is unsure of the factual or legal situation, there is no reason the
pleader should not simply so state and allow the clarification to be accom-
plished in the subsequent litigation process.
The court has looked favorably upon effectuating the policy described.
As examples, it has permitted the pleading of alternate theories of defa-
mation and invasion of privacy, 43 and of tort and contract, 44 for a wrong
growing out of a single transaction, and the naming of alternate defen-
40. Thayer v. Anacortes School Dist., 81 Wn. 2d 709, 504 P.2d 1130 (1972); Makah Indian
Tribe v. Clallam County, 73 Wn. 2d 677, 440 P.2d 442 (1968). A party may waive the admission by
failing to raise the matter and allowing a trial to be conducted on the averments. Card v. Western
Farmers Ass'n, 72 Wn. 2d 45, 431 P.2d 206 (1967) (plaintiff failed to respond to counterclaim. but
defendant deemed to waive the matter by permitting a trial to proceed on the averments in the coun-
terclaim).
41. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(d).
42. WASH. SUPER. CT. Ctv. R. 8(e)(2).
43. Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wn. 2d 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964).
44. Anderson Feed & Produce Co. v. Moore, 66 Wn. 2d 237, 401 P.2d 864 (1965).
694
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dants and combinations of defendants as possibly responsible for a single
injury in a single transaction when the plaintiff was unsure who was re-
sponsible. 45
The pleader will not be allowed a double recovery for a single wrong
by such pleading46 nor may the pleader thereby combine claims which
require litigation before courts with different subject matter jurisdiction. 47
There is also the fundamental limitation that the adversary must not be
misled or otherwise seriously prejudiced by the alternate, hypothetical
and inconsistent pleading. 48 Lastly, all such pleading is subject to the
good faith obligations of Civil Rule 11, discussed later.
Perhaps the best summary of the general approach to pleading is the
admonition in Civil Rule 8(f) that all pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice. This has led to a generally liberal, flexible and fa-
vorable construction on behalf of the pleader. 49 Even when parts of a
pleading are found defective, the entire pleading need not be stricken,
and, if stricken, leave to amend should be liberally granted. 50 Despite all
this, there is also the fact that the concluding passage in Civil Rule 8 is
that one is not to consider the adoption of the rules as an "adoption or
approval" of the federal forms approved in Federal Rule 84. Certainly in
1960, and probably even today, a more conservative approach to pleading
is advisable in Washington than in the federal courts. It is not inconsis-
tent, however, to observe that as time passes Washington pleading be-
comes more and more like that in the federal system.
II. PLEADING SPECIAL MATTERS
Because of peculiar problems thought to relate to certain items, specific
provision is made in Civil Rule 9 as to the pleading of such items. Par-
ticular note should be taken that such provisions govern only the matter of
pleading. There is no intent to shift or alter the burden of proof which
otherwise exists as to such items. 51
It is not necessary to aver the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or
the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, or
the legal existence of an organized association of persons that-is made a
45. Greene v. Rothschild, 60 Wn. 2d 508, 374 P.2d 566 (1962).
46. Brink v. Griffith, 65 Wn. 2d 253, 396 P.2d 793 (1964).
47. Hill v. Hill, 3 Wn. App. 783,477 P.2d 931 (1970).
48. See Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 745,537 P.2d 807 (1975).
49. See Pearson v. Vandermay, 67 Wn. 2d 222,407 P.2d 143 (1965); Palmer v. Glens Falls Ins.
Group, 58 Wn. 2d 88, 360 P.2d 742 (1961).
50. Reed v. Streib, 65 Wn. 2d 700,399 P.2d 338 (1965).
51. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(1).
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party. 52 This is so because in the ordinary case there is no issue as to such
matters and any such averments would be purely formal in nature. Conse-
quently, if there is an issue, it is to be raised by a "specific negative
averment which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly
within the pleader's knowledge." Ordinarily, such a negative averment
will be included in the defendant's answer. 53 The issue may, however, be
raised by a motion to dismiss. 54
Instances in which specificity is required involve averments of fraud or
mistake. The circumstances constituting either must be stated with par-
ticularity, though it is not necessary that the words themselves be used if
the pleading is otherwise satisfactory. 55 Presumably, some of the reasons
for requiring specificity are the generality of meaning of such terms, the
ease of making such allegations, and the possible harm to the adversary
simply by virtue of the allegation, particularly in the case of fraud. On the
other hand, conditions of mind of a person, such as malice, intent and
knowledge, may be averred generally. 56 Presumably, this is because of
the difficulty in describing such conditions specifically in words and the
belief that adequate notice is given by the more general allegation.
Generality in pleading is also permited as to conditions precedent. It is
sufficient to plead generally that such conditions have been performed or
have occurred. 57 This does not excuse the complete absence of reference
to such conditions if they are essential to the statement of a claim. 58 If the
adversary wishes to raise an issue about the alleged performance or occur-
rence, he is to do so by a specific denial of the particular condition or
conditions. As previously noted, Civil Rule 9 is not intended to alter the
burden of proof. Consequently, the burden of establishing the perform-
ance or occurrence of the particular conditions precedent, once identified,
will rest with the proponent. 59
Several subsections of Civil Rule 9 seem to have generated no prob-
lems. These include the provisions that in pleading an official document
52. WASH. SUPER CT. CIV. R. 9(a).
53. Reese Sales Co. v. Gier. 16 Wn. App. 664, 557 P.2d 1326 (1977) (the negative averment of
plaintiffs' capacity was in a trial amendment: held there was "substantial compliance'" with Civil
Rule 9(a)).
54. Roth v. Drainage Improvement Dist. No. 5. 64 Wn. 2d 586 392 P.2d 1012 (1964).
55. McInnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 63 Wn. 2d 652. 388 P.2d 562 (1964). See
also Viewcrest Coop. Ass'n v. Deer, 70 Wn. 2d 290, 422 P.2d 832 (1967).
56. WAsH. SUPER. Cr. Cit. R 9(b).
57. WASIH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(c).
58. It is not necessary to plead procedural conditions precedent. Goodner v. Chicago. Mil., St.
P. & Pac. R. R., 61 Wn. 2d 12,377 P.2d 231 (1962) (filing ofclaim against county).
59. Multi-Products Eng'r Co. v, Bellingham Steel Prods,. Inc.. 66 Wn. 2d 82, 401 P 2d 329
(1965); Ross v. Harding. 64 Wn. 2d 231, 391 P.2d 526 (1964). See also Jenson v Richens. 74 Wn
2d 41, 442 P.2d 636 (1968).
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or act, it is sufficient to aver that the document was issued or the act done
in compliance with law60 and that it is sufficient to aver a judgment or
decision of a judicial body, domestic or foreign, without setting forth
matter showing there was jurisdiction. 61 Also seemingly creating no
problem is the provision that for the purpose of testing the sufficiency of a
pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall be consid-
ered like all other averments of material matter. 62 This does not mean that
such averments are always required, but rather that when the substantive
law requires their pleading to state a claim, they shall be considered mate-
rial. 63 Lastly in this context, no significant cases have arisen under the
provision that items of special damage must be specifically stated.64 Con-
sequently, former case law continues to govern. 65
Special provision is made for the pleading of law in certain instances.
In pleading an ordinance it is said to be sufficient to state the title of such
ordinance and the date of its passage, whereupon the court is directed to
take judicial notice of the existence of the ordinance and its tenor and
effect. 66 A failure to meet this minimum pleading requirement, either
originally or by amendment, has resulted in refusals by trial and appellate
courts to take judicial notice. 67 A recent Washington Supreme Court deci-
sion emphasizes again, however, that every effort is to be made to avoid
disposing of litigation on technical, procedural considerations. 68 Conse-
quently, it was held to be error to dismiss an action against a city because
of the failure to plead the pertinent city ordinance. The court said that it
was proper to consider the plaintiff's allegations of fact made initially on
appeal in determining whether there was any state of facts supporting a
valid claim. The end result was that while the plaintiff's failure to plead
the ordinance by title and date would presumably preclude the court from
taking judicial notice of it, the failure did not preclude the plaintiff from
having stated a claim which required disposition on the merits rather than
on a technical pleading violation. At the time of ruling on the motion
directed at the pleading, the plaintiff was to be given the benefit of the
60. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(d).
61. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(e).
62. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(f).
63. See L. ORLAND, 3 WASHINGTON PRACTICE 694-95 (2d ed. 1968).
64. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(g).
65. See Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wn. 2d 763, 388 P.2d 976 (1964) (libelous per se
publication allows recovery without alleging special damages).
66. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 9(i). Subsection (h) is similar in providing that in the pleading of
the existence of a city or town in Washington, it is sufficient to state that the city or town exists and is
incorporated or organized under Washington law.
67. State v. Martin, 14 Wn. App. 717, 544 P.2d 750 (1976); Gabl v. Alaska Loan & Inv. Co., 6
Wn. App. 880,496 P.2d 548 (1972).
68. Halverson v. Dahl, 89 Wn. 2d 673,574 P.2d 1190(1978).
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doubt that he would be able to prove at trial his right to recover because of
the alleged failure of city officials to enforce building, housing and safety
codes. Presumably, similar construction will be given to the provision
that in the pleading of a private statute, or right thereunder, it is sufficient
to refer to the statute by title and date of passage and that the court shall
thereupon take judicial notice thereof. 69
A subject necessitating some extended treatment is the pleading of for-
eign (state and country) law. Nothing directly is stated about the matter in
Civil Rule 9, the rule dealing with most specialized pleading matters. In-
stead there is simply a reference in subsection (k) to RCW 5.24.010-
.070, the Washington version of the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign
Laws Act. This statute was adopted in 1941 and, despite the possible sug-
gestion in the title, applies only to the law of other states of the United
States, not to the law of foreign countries. As indicated by the title to the
Uniform Act, it is principally concerned with specifying the circum-
stances and manner in which judicial notice of other states' law is to be
taken. 70 As related to the subject of this article, the principal provision is
the directive that the chapter is not to be construed to relieve a party of the
duty of pleading other states' laws as required under the law and practice
of this state. 71
Generally this means that if one wishes to rely upon the law of another
state, one must plead it. 72 A failure to do so results in a presumption that
69. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 90).
70. The background and effect of the Act are discussed in Comment, Judicial Notice of Foreign
Law. 38 WASH. L. REV. 802 (1963). Earlier discussions of the subject ofjudicial notice may be found
in Falknor. Evidence, 16 WASH. L. REV. 66 (1941) and 14 WASH. L. REV. 222 (1939).
A comment to Rule 201 of the Washington Rules of Evidence, prepared by the Judicial Council
Task Force on Evidence, states that RCW 5.24.010 is not in conflict with and is not superseded by
Rule 201, which relates to judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
71. RCW 5.24.040, when adopted in 1941, provided as follows: "NecessitY of pleading foreign
laws. This chapter shall not be construed to relieve any party of the duty of hereafter pleading such
laws where required under the law and practice of this state immediately prior to the enactment
hereof."
During the 1981 legislative session, the legislature amended the statute by striking the last phrase.
"immediately prior to the enactment hereof." See Senate Committee Amendment to Substitute
House Bill No. 601.
It is not immediately apparent what the ramifications of the amendment may be. One possible
effect is to enable the adoption of a court rule modifying the present pleading requirements, perhaps
along the line of Civil Rule 44.1 (a), which applies to the law of a foreign country.
The textual discussion of the subject is based upon the available authorities which preceded the
adoption of the 1981 statutory amendment.
72. Comment, supra note 70, at 804-05, suggests two narrow exceptions to the rule that the law
of other states must be pleaded, namely, (1) when suit is brought on a judgment of another state and
there is a question whether the other court had personal jurisdiction over the defendant based on that
state's law as to service of process, and (2) when a party relies on another state's law and is then
estopped from objecting to the adversary's reliance on such law.
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the law of the other state is the same as that in Washington. 73 This pre-
sumption has been applied most often in the context of case law, but also
applies to statutory law. 74 Even if the parties specify the application of the
law of a particular state in a contract, that law will be considered to be the
same as Washington law if the other state's law is not pleaded. 75
One might expect that this means that in the event of a failure to plead,
the court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the foreign state's law
but might exercise discretion to do so. There is authority, however, that
the court is precluded from taking judicial notice. 76
With such strong emphasis upon the necessity of pleading, the manner
of doing so becomes of prime consequence. Unfortunately, there is some
lack of clarity as to what is required. With respect to statutes, authority is
divided as to whether they may be stated in substance 77 or must be set
forth verbatim. 78 As to case law, no definitive statement of method has
been found. 79 The argument in favor of allowing for a general allegation
of the foreign state law, whether case or statute, is the purpose of modem
pleading, namely, to give fair notice to the adversary and the court. An
argument in favor of more detailed pleading in this particular instance is
to aid the court in ascertaining the content of the foreign state law in order
that it might be applied. 80 This objective could be accomplished, how-
ever, by means other than a full recitation in the pleadings.
In the final analysis the question becomes one of what prudent counsel
should do. The advisable approach as to statutes is to cite and quote them
verbatim and as to case law to concisely summarize it and cite the sup-
porting authority. 81
As noted, the Uniform Act previously discussed does not apply to the
law of foreign countries. That subject is now governed by a court rule
adopted in 1977 which provides that a party who intends to raise an issue
73. Investment Serv. Co. v. LaLonde, 63 Wn. 2d 834, 389 P.2d 414 (1964); Lappin v. Lucurell,
13 Wn. App. 277, 534 P.2d 1038 (1975); Save-Way Drug, Inc. v. Standard Inv. Co., 5 Wn. App.
726,490 P.2d 1342 (1971).
74. Nissen v. Gatlin, 60 Wn. 2d 259, 373 P.2d 491 (1962) (presumption that Alaska had a stat-
ute similar to that in Washington).
75. Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Hutton, 84 Wn. 2d 320, 525 P.2d 223 (1974).
76. Allen v. Saccomanno, 40 Wn. 2d 283, 242 P.2d 747 (1952).
77. Allard v. La Plain, 147 Wash. 497, 266 P. 688 (1928).
78. Martin Bros. v. Nettleton, 138 Wash. 102,244 P. 386 (1926).
79. But see Byrne v. Cooper, 11 Wn. App. 549, 523 P.2d 1216 (1974), a case involving the law
of a foreign nation (England), in which it was said that decisional law should be "concisely recapitu-
lated." The Byrne opinion, incidentally, seems to mistakenly rely upon RCW 5.24.040 as governing
the pleading of foreign country law, though RCW ch. 5.24 is directed only at foreign state law.
80. See Edlin v. Edlin, 42 Wn. 2d 445,256 P.2d 283 (1953).
81. See the recommended forms in L. ORLAND & D. REAUGH, 9 WASHINGTON PRACrICE 244
(1971).
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concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice in the pleadings
or other reasonable written notice. 82
If such reasonable notice is not given, presumably the effect will be in
accordance with prior authority. While the court will presume the un-
known law of another state to be the same as Washington, such appar-
ently is not true with the law of foreign countries, at least if the other
country is not a common-law country. This was the result reached in a
claim based upon the law of Japan. The Japanese law was neither pleaded
nor proved and consequently the claim was dismissed. 83 Had the claim
been based upon the law of Oregon, the presumption would have resulted
in applying Washington law.
If the claim is based upon the common law of another country, there is
some basis to believe that such law will be presumed to be the same as
that in Washington. 84 If the claim has a statutory base, there is reason to
doubt that it will be presumed that another common-law country has the
same statutes as Washington with the result that a claim based thereon
might be dismissed. 85
It seems appropriate to suggest that if the court is prepared to presume
that Alaska has adopted similar statutes, 86 a similar presumption might be
made as to British Columbia. There seems to be no justifiable basis to
82. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 44.1(a). Subsection (b) simply refers to RCW 5.24. Subsection
(c) then provides:
Other Jurisdictions. The court, in determining the law of any jurisdiction other than a state,
territory, or other jurisdiction of the United States, may consider any relevant written material or
other source, including testimony, having due regard for their trustworthiness, whether or not
submitted by a party and whether or not admissible under the rules of evidence. If the court
considers any material or source not received in open court, prior to its determination the court
shall:
(1) Identify in the record such material or source;
(2) Summarize in the record any unwritten information received; and
(3) Afford the parties an opportunity to respond thereto. The court's determination shall be
treated as a ruling on a question of law.
83. Toshoku, Ltd. v. Blackmar, 72 Wn. 2d 10, 431 P.2d 599 (1967). The court relied upon Philp
v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958), in which the Washington-based federal court refused to
presume the defamation law of Peru to be the same as that in Washington.
84. See, e.g., Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 P. 941 (1910).
85. Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1958), contains the following passage:
We hold that the instant case is controlled by the principles set forth by Justice Holmes in
Cuba R. Co. v. Crosby, 1912, 222 U.S. 473, 32 S.Ct. 132, 56 L.Ed. 274. There, the Court was
unwilling to assume that the law of Cuba (locus delicti) was the same as the common law. Thus.
as the law of Cuba had not been pleaded or proved, the judgment entered for plaintiff in the trial
court was reversed. Holmes pointed out that while it might be reasonable to presume that as
between two common law countries, the common law of one was the same as that of another:
that even as between two such countries there would be no such presumption where a statute was
involved; i.e., a statute of one would not be presumed to be a statute of the other; and where both
were not common law countries, the limits of the presumption would be narrower still.
86. This occurred in Nissen v. Gatlin, 60 Wn. 2d 259, 373 P.2d 491 (1962).
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distinguish between statutory and case law when the two countries have
comparable legal principles and systems. 87
Because of the potential hazards, the better practice with foreign coun-
tries as with foreign states is to cite and set forth statutes verbatim and to
summarize the case law with citation to appropriate authority. 88 It may be
expected that in the foreign country context strict pleading requirements
will more often create a problem than is true with foreign state law be-
cause of the frequent need to include translations and interpretations of
the foreign country's law. If the court is not flexible in imposing controls,
the result may be unduly voluminous complaints and answers, which in
turn will necessitate extensive research and expense before preparing a
pleading. It is most important to keep in mind that fair notice is the pri-
mary consideration at this point in the process and that Civil Rule 44.1
itself allows for other "reasonable" written notice. 89 That same "reason-
able" construction should be applied to pleadings. Lastly, if such "rea-
sonable" construction is appropriate for pleading the law of a foreign
country, it ought to be appropriate for foreign state law as well.
III. FORM AND SIGNING OF PLEADINGS
Civil Rule 10 sets forth general guidelines and recommendations with
respect to the form to be followed in preparing pleadings. No particular
problems seem to have arisen with respect to these matters.
Perhaps the most important provision to note is subdivision (b) which
relates to paragraphing and separation of statements. It will be recalled
that a party may set forth as many separate claims or defenses as the party
has regardless of consistency and may also set forth two or more state-
ments of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one
count or defense or separate counts or defenses. 90
Civil Rule 10(b) is intended to provide guidance in how these, and
comparable matters, should be stated. Each statement of a claim or de-
fense is to be made in numbered paragraphs with the contents of each
paragraph limited "as far as practicable" to a statement of a single set of
circumstances. Further, each claim based upon a separate transaction or
87. See L. ORLAND, 3 WASHINGTON PRAcTICa 698-99 (2d ed. 1968).
88. See Byrne v. Cooper, 11 Wn. App. 549, 523 P.2d 1216 (1974), decided before the adoption
of Civil Rule 44.1.
89. After the adoption in 1977 of WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 44.1, the Washington State Judicial
Council opened a file with respect to a proposal to amend Civil Rule 9 on the subject of pleading
foreign law. The minutes of the Council meeting of April 25, 1980 indicate the file was closed be-
cause "the current law is not sufficiently troublesome to justify the development of a new court
rule." Minutes of the Washington State Judicial Council at 6 (Apr. 25, 1980).
90. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(e)(2).
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occurrence, and each defense other than denials, is to be stated in a sepa-
rate count or defense "whenever a separation facilitates the clear presen-
tation of the matters set forth."
The important consideration is clarity and this should be the objective
of the pleader. But, as the quoted qualifications suggest, neither the par-
ties nor the courts should concern themselves unduly with matters of
form. If the objective of fair notice is accomplished, that should suffice.
If that is kept in mind, the process will not become burdened with mo-
tions and rulings relating to form, and the merits will be more readily
reached and resolved. The lack of appellate opinions involving questions
under Civil Rule 10 suggests this is being accomplished to the credit of all
concerned.
With respect to the signing of pleadings, it has been provided since the
original enactment of the pleading rules in 1960 that every pleading in
which the party is represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name. 91 Changes have
occurred over the years, however, with respect to the circumstances
under which a party must sign and/or verify a pleading.
The federal rule in 1960 required the signing of pleadings by an attor-
ney and dispensed with verification by the party except in a few cases in
which verification was otherwise specifically required by a rule or statute.
When Washington adopted a comparable rule, the provision requiring
signing by the attorney was included, but the provision with respect to
verification by the party was deleted. Thus the requirement that pleadings
be verified in the manner and to the extent required by the then-existing
Washington statute continued. This meant that many pleadings had to be
signed by the attorney and verified by the party. 92 In 1967, Civil Rule I 1
was amended, and while it differed in a few ways from the federal rule, it
basically adopted the federal position whereby pleadings were to be
signed by the attorney and no verification by the party was required.
The last amendment of the rule occurred in 1974. It continued the basic
policy of requiring signing by the attorney but no verification by the
party. It added the following language, however: "Petitions for dissolu-
tion of marriage, separation, declarations concerning the validity of a
marriage, custody, and modification of decrees issued as a result of any of
the foregoing petitions shall be verified. Other pleadings need not. but
may be, verified or accompanied by affidavit.' 93
91. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 1I.
92. R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 3, at 24-25.
93. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 1I. The reason stated for the verification requirement in the speci-
fied instances was to impress upon the parties the seriousness of the proceedings. One wonders why
these are more serious than other proceedings. Civil Rule 23.1 continues to require verification of a
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The end result of these changes is that, except for domestic relations
litigation, in the ordinary case in which a party is represented by an attor-
ney, there will be no verification but rather simply the signature of the
attorney. 94 The signature constitutes a certificate that the attorney (or the
party if such be the case) has read the pleading, that to the best of the
attorney's knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to sup-
port it, and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or
is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, it may be stricken as
sham and false. 95 Further, a willful violation of the rule may subject the
attorney to appropriate action as for contempt. 96
IV. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS
The general guidelines for the statement of claims and defenses have
been discussed. There is the additional matter of how one goes about at-
tacking the adversary's averments. It will be recalled that ordinarily the
attack will be by the defendant directed against the plaintiff's assertions
since it is most unusual for the plaintiff to be obligated (or even permit-
ted) to attack the defendant's averments. Consequently, the principal con-
cern in this section will be with the problems generated when the defen-
dant raises defenses and objections to the plaintiff's statement of a
claim. 97
The defendant may, of course, assert his defenses in the answer. De-
fenses of every type may be asserted therein including those which go to
the merits, such as contentions of failure to state a claim, denials and
affirmative defenses, and in addition defenses which related to procedural
considerations, such as lack of jurisdiction over the person or subject mat-
ter, improper venue and questions relating to joinder of persons and
claims. In the ordinary case the time for answer is twenty days if service
is made within the state and sixty days if service is by publication or is
made in accordance with the long-arm statute or non-resident motorist
statute. 98
complaint in a shareholder's derivative action. The 1974 amendment to Civil Rule 11 also added the
requirement that all pleadings be dated in order to facilitate review of the record.
94. If a party is not represented by an attorney, the party must, of course, sign and date the
pleading.
95. An instance in which a complaint was stricken under Civil Rule 11 as sham and false is
McFerran v. Sanwick, 61 Wn. 2d 123, 377 P.2d 405 (1962). It was held that since the order did not
dismiss the action it was not an appealable order. Id. at 125, 377 P.2d at 406.
96. Disciplinary action through the state bar association also seems possible. R. MEISENHOLDER,
supra note 3, at 26.
97. Similar problems arise when defenses are asserted to counterclaims and cross-claims under
Civil Rule 13 and to third-party claims under Civil Rule 14.
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The defendant may also attack the plaintiff's averments through the use
of several motions, the most common of which is a motion to dismiss.
The motion should be designated as a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim rather than for failure to state a cause of action, though any such
mislabeling will be ignored. 99
Beginning with the first cases under the newly adopted rule 00 and con-
tinuing through the most recent cases, the court has, commendably, con-
sistently looked with favor upon the pleader. In one of the first cases de-
cided under the rule the approach enunciated was that of a refusal to
dismiss a complaint unless it appeared, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff
could prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief. 101 Almost two decades later the court continued to assert this test
with the added observation that any hypothetical situation conceivably
raised by the complaint defeats a 12(b)(6) motion if it is legally sufficient
to support the plaintiff's claim. 102 The legal standard is whether any state
of facts supporting a valid claim can be conceived which has even al-
lowed for additional allegations of fact being made initially on appeal. 103
In addition to a willingness to speculate as to the facts that might be pre-
sented, the court has sustained a complaint and permitted the presentation
of evidence under a theory of recovery though that theory was not specifi-
cally identified in the pleadings. 104
Even with the liberal pleading rule, there will, of course, be times
when the conclusion will be that there has been a failure to state a claim.
This was true in a taxpayers' action against the state attorney general be-
cause of an alleged wrong in the attorney general's failure to seek recov-
ery of funds paid out under an unconstitutional statute,10 5 a declaratory
judgment action which "seem[ed] to relate" to a grievance concerning
surety bonds required of officers of a state-chartered credit union and the
explusion of members from the credit union, 10 6 and a libel action based
upon a press release from the attorney general's office about pending liti-
98. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(a). The methods by which actions may be commenced are
discussed in Trautman. Commencement of Actions and Service of Process in Washington. 16 WIL-
LAMET-rE L. REv. 87 (1979).
99. Williamson v. Grant County Pub. Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 65 Wn. 2d 245. 396 P.2d 879 (1964).
Cf. Sim v. Washington State Parks & Recreation Comm'n. 90 Wn. 2d 378. 583 P.2d 1193 (1978)
(motion for change of venue mislabeled).
100. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(b)(6).
101. Sherwood v. Moxee School Dist. No. 90, 58 Wn. 2d 351, 363 P.2d 138 (1961).
102. Halvorson v. Dahl. 89 Wn. 2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190(1978).
103. Id.
104. Potter v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc.. 19 Wn. App. 746, 578 P.2d 859(1978).
105. Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wn. 2d 756, 567 P.2d 187 (1977) (5-3 decision). See also Shutt v.
Moore, 26 Wn. App. 450, 613 P.2d 1188(1980).
106. Philipp v. State, 66 Wn. 2d 921,400 P.2d 769 (1965).
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gation when the state official had an absolute privilege. 10 7 In each in-
stance the conclusion was that the pertinent substantive law did not allow
any possibility of recovery and consequently there was no reason to pro-
ceed with discovery and trial.
Assuming, however, that the substantive law does provide a basis for
recovery, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will result in a
construction of the claim in the light most favorable to the pleader. 108
Regardless of the nature of the claim or action, the factual allegations of
the complaint will be accepted as true for the purpose of ruling on the
motion. 109
A particularly useful function of the motion to dismiss is as a device to
test the validity of a newly asserted substantive claim. Illustrative of this
are cases in which the questions posed were whether to allow an action by
a minor child for loss of parental "consortium" occasioned by negligent
injury to the parent by the defendant," 10 an action against one who had
provided liquor to another who later caused injury to the plaintiff, "'1 an
action for the tort of outrage,112 and an action against a restaurant on the
theories of breach of implied warranty and strict liability for alleged inju-
ries caused by a shattered wine glass.113 Similarly, the motion may be
used to test the question whether an established substantive claim should
be abolished due to changing social conditions. 114
As noted initially, the usual instance for a 12(b)(6) motion is by the
defendant directed against the plaintiff's complaint. It is also the appro-
priate means to test the legal validity of a counterclaim, a cross-claim" 15
or a claim in a third-party complaint. 116
Civil Rule 12(b) contains the additional relevant provision that if, on a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, matters outside the pleading
107. Gold Seal Chinchillas, Inc. v. State, 69 Wn. 2d 828,420 P.2d 698 (1966).
108. Barnum v. State, 72 Wn. 2d 928, 435 P.2d 678 (1967) (refusal to dismiss action against
state for tortious injury in which state would be immune for "discretionary" actions, but liable for
"operational" actions).
109. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977) (breach of promise to marry); Hofto
v. Blumer, 74 Wn. 2d 321, 444 P.2d 657 (1968) (automobile accident); Higgins v. State, 70 Wn. 2d
323,422 P.2d 836 (1967) (breach of contract).
110. Roth v. Bell, 24 Wn. App. 92, 600 P.2d 602 (1979) (action dismissed).
I 11. Halvorson v. Birchfield Boiler, Inc., 76 Wn. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969) (action dis-
missed; 5-4 decision).
112. Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn. 2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978);
Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wn. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977); Grimsby v. Samson,
85 Wn. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975) (in each instance, motion denied).
113. Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wn. 2d 295,588 P.2d 233 (1978) (action sustained).
114. Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wn. 2d 614, 565 P.2d 94 (1977) (action for breach of promise to
marry held not to violate public policy).
115. McMenamin v. Bishop, 6 Wn. App. 455,493 P.2d 1016 (1972).
116. Higgins v. State, 70 Wn. 2d 323,422 P.2d 836 (1967).
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are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as
one for summary judgment. 117 This necessitates some comparison of the
two motions.
If a motion to dismiss or to strike the complaint or for judgment is
made and the only matter before the court is the complaint, the motion
will be treated as one under Civil Rule 12(b)(6). 118 This is true even if the
motion is labeled as one for summary judgment. 119 On the other hand, if
the court considers other matters, such as affidavits, depositions, answers
to interrogatories and the like, the proceeding may be treated as one for
summary judgment. 120
As Rule 12(b)(6) indicates, the court may if it wishes exclude matters
other than the pleading. It seems that ordinarily this would be unwise. If
the court considers only the complaint in ruling on the motion, a denial is
likely to result in another motion, this time for summary judgment with
the accompanying materials. Certainly it is true that the court has in nu-
merous instances admitted other matters and treated the motion as one for
summary judgment. 121
To be compared is the situation in which the content of other matters
makes no difference to the disposition of the motion and in which the
court can say that as a matter of law, regardless of what is contained in the
extraneous material, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief. In such a situa-
tion there is no need to convert a 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for sum-
mary judgment and thereby allow the non-moving party an opportunity to
controvert the matters submitted outside the pleading. Even if the trial
court considers the other matters, they are immaterial and not harmful to
117. For a discussion of summary judgments, see Trautman, Motions for Summary Judgment:
Their Use and Effect in Washington, 45 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1970).
118. See Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, 92
Wn. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 182 (1979); Lightner v. Balow, 59 Wn. 2d 856, 370 P.2d 982 (1962).
119. Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn. 2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978): Maki
v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 73 Wn. 2d 23, 436 P.2d 186 (1968). Cf. Peterson v. Pacific First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 23 Wn. App. 688, 598 P.2d 704 (1979).
120. Washington Optometric Ass'n v. County of Pierce, 73 Wn. 2d 445, 438 P.2d 861 (1968).
121. Highline School Dist. No. 401 v. Port of Seattle, 87 Wn. 2d 6, 548 P.2d 1085 (1976)
(motion for judgment on the pleadings); Stevens v. Murphy, 69 Wn. 2d 939, 421 P.2d 668 (1966)
(motion for judgment on the pleadings); Downtown Traffic Planning Comm. v. Royer, 26 Wn. App.
156, 612 P.2d 430 (1980) (prayer for dismissal in answer); Vaughn v. Vaughn, 23 Wn. App. 527.
597 P.2d 932 (1979) (motion for judgment on the pleadings); Sims v. KIRO. Inc., 20 Wn. App. 229,
580 P.2d 642 (1978); Askin v. Crown Zellerbach, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 817. 509 P.2d 379 (1973):
Blakely v. Housing Auth., 8 Wn. App. 204, 505 P.2d 151 (1973).
Puget Sound Bulb Exch. v. Metal Bldgs. Insulation, Inc., 9 Wn. App. 284, 513 P.2d 102 (1973).
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974), held that matters outside the pleadings might be presented on a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the person under Civil Rule 12(b)(2), and. if not
excluded by the court, the motion would be treated as one for a summary judgment. Cf. In re Estate
of Boyd. 5 Wn. App. 32. 485 P.2d 469 (1971) (motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 should
have been treated as one for judgment on the pleadings: label given a motion is unimportant).
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the plaintiff since there is no possibility that the plaintiff can recover
under his claim. 122
All of this serves to raise the question of what difference it makes
whether disposition of a case is under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) or 56 (the sum-
mary judgment rule). In Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc.,123 a five to four
decision, the Washington Supreme Court in a footnote stated as follows
about "the distinction between motions under CR 12(b)(6) and summary
judgment motions under CR 56":
A summary judgment motion calls upon the court to determine from
the pleadings and supporting documents whether any genuine issue
of material fact exists requiring a trial. . . . A CR 12(b)(6) motion
questions only the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a pleading.
But since this legal determination cannot always be made in a vac-
uum, it may be necessary to postulate factual situations which might
form the basis for the pleading. No reason appears why one such
"hypothetical" situation should not be that which the complaining
party contends actually exists. The court need not find that any sup-
port for the alleged "facts" exists or would be admissible at trial, as
it should on a summary judgment motion. The question under a CR
12(b)(6) motion is basically a legal one, and the "facts" are consid-
ered only as a conceptual backdrop for the legal determination.
Arguably, this statement creates some uncertainty. It can be read to
mean that while a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim raises a
question which is "basically a legal one," the motion for a summary
judgment raises a question which is "basically" something else. That, of
course, is not true. Both motions, and also a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, raise a legal question. The moving party in both instances is
asserting that he should prevail as a matter of law. In neither case is it
proper to grant the motion unless the court concludes the legal question in
favor of the movant.
The difference in the two lies in the basis on which the court deter-
mines whether the movant is entitled to judgment. In the instance of the
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court has only the plead-
ing of the plaintiff to consider. The court must look at the asserted facts in
the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine whether the mo-
vant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. In the instance of a motion
for summary judgment, the parties and the court are not restricted to the
pleadings. Looking at materials such as affidavits, depositions and an-
122. Ortblad v. State, 85 Wn. 2d 109, 530 P.2d 635 (1975); Loger v. Wash. Timber Prods.,
Inc., 8 Wn. App. 921, 509 P.2d 1009 (1973).
123. 86 Wn. 2d 293,298 n.2,545 P.2d 13, 17 n.2 (1975).
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swers to interrogatories, the court must determine whether there are any
genuine issues of fact to be tried, but still the motion cannot be granted
unless the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Both
motions then raise the legal question of recovery or non-recovery. The
advantage of the summary judgment procedure is that it may better enable
the movant to show, and the court to determine, that there is no genuine
issue of fact, thereby entitling the movant to judgment. It is in recognition
of this that Civil Rule 12(b)(6) allows for the motion to dismiss to be
converted into a motion for summary judgment. 124
Presumably, this is what the court meant in the Brown case. The ques-
tion raised by both motions is "basically a legal one." The difference is
the materials available to the court in resolving the legal question.
Instead of moving to dismiss on the basis of the complaint, the defen-
dant may wait until all the pleadings are completed and then move for
judgment on the pleadings. 125 The test to be applied is similar to that for a
motion to dismiss. The court will look at the pleadings in the light most
favorable to the non-movant to determine whether the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.126 Also, as with the motion to dismiss, if
matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court,
the motion may be treated as one for summary judgment. 127 In the event
of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for judgment on the
pleadings, the motion may be heard before trial or deferred until the trial
at the discretion of the trial court. 128
Another motion which may be directed against a pleading is that it be
made more definite. The federal rule limits the use of a motion for a more
definite statement to the situation in which the pleading is so vague or
ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a re-
sponsive pleading.1 29 Thereunder, the motion may not properly be used
to obtain information in preparation for trial. That is to be accomplished
through the discovery process. At the time of the adoption of the equiva-
lent Washington rule, language was added permitting the motion to be
directed against a pleading "if more particularity in that pleading will
further the efficient, economical disposition of the action." 30 Concern
was expressed that the added language would require more particularity
124. See J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE RULES PAMPHLET 480 (Part 1 1980).
125. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(c). Madison v. General Acceptance Corp.. 26 Wn. App.
387, 612 P.2d 826 (1980), states that a motion to dismiss the complaint following the filing of an
answer will be considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
126. See Pearson v. Vandermay, 67 Wn. 2d 222, 407 P.2d 143 (1965).
127. See cases cited note 121 supra.
128. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(d).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).
130. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(e).
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in pleading claims in Washington than in federal courts 131 and that it
might even result in a continuation of the technical requirements of code
pleading. 132 Whether this has been so or not is not clear from appellate
opinions. There is a complete dearth of authority interpreting the rule.
The fact that there is such lack of authority, however, suggests that what
would be satisfactory to withstand a motion for a more definite statement
in the federal courts will likewise be sufficient in most cases in state
courts. 133 This is buttressed by the growing acceptance of general notice
pleading with the passage of time and the continuing liberal construction
of what constitutes an adequate statement of a claim. 134
Another motion which has received little construction, thereby sug-
gesting it is little used or allowed, is the motion to strike. 135 It is the
appropriate motion by the plaintiff directed against an "insufficient de-
fense" and by either party directed against "redundant, immaterial, im-
pertinent, or scandalous matter." Ordinarily, only the inappropriate mat-
ter should be stricken rather than the entire pleading and if the pleading is
stricken, leave to amend should be liberally granted. 136
Generally, if a party makes a motion under Civil Rule 12 and fails to
raise other defenses or objections permitted to be raised by motion under
the rule, such omitted grounds are waived.137 If no motion is made, the
defenses may be raised in the answer, but, again, those omitted are gener-
ally waived. '3 8
Two exceptions to such waiver provisions relevant to pleading are the
defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and the
objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim. Specific provision
is made that such matters may be raised later by motion for judgment on
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits. 139
This suggests that it is not timely to raise such matters for the first time
after the trial has been completed. This conclusion is also supported by
the fact that specific provision is made for raising the defense of lack of
131. See the excellent discussion of the reason for the insertion of the added language and the
expected result in R. MEISENHOLDER, supra note 3, at 7-9.
132. See L. OR.ND, 3 WASHINGTON PRACtiCE 602 (2d ed. 1968).
133. This is believed to be the situation even though- Washington has not adopted the forms
which accompany the federal rules and has expressly declined such adoption or approach. See WASH.
SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(f).
134. See text accompanying notes 100-104 supra.
135. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(f).
136. Reed v. Streib, 65 Wn. 2d 700, 399 P.2d 338 (1965).
137. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(g).
138. WASH. SUPER. Cr. Civ. R. 12(b) & (h).
139. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(h)(2). A similar exception is stated for the defense of failure
to join a party indispensable under Civil Rule 19.
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jurisdiction of the subject matter at any time. 140 Had it been intended that
the same was true with respect to failure to state a claim or a legal defense
to a claim, presumably similar provision would have been made rather
than restricting the time to that of the trial.
Some confusion is created, however, by a Washington Court of Ap-
peals opinion, Sparkman & McLean Income Fund v. Wald. 141 On appeal
the plaintiff asserted the argument, not raised in the trial court, that the
defendant's counterclaim was not valid in that no law provided a basis for
affirmative relief. 142 In effect the contention was that there was a failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court allowed the
issue to be raised for the first time on appeal and held there was error in
entering judgment on the counterclaim.
No mention was made of Civil Rule 12(h)(2). Instead the court relied
upon a then-existing appellate rule which provided that the objection that
"the complaint does not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of ac-
tion . . .may be taken at any time." 143 In addition, reliance was placed
upon cases decided before the enactment of the present pleading rules. 144
The appellate rule relied upon in Sparkman has since been superseded.
There is still some confusion, however, by reason of the pertinent appel-
late rule enacted since the time of the Sparkman case. Rule of Appellate
Procedure 2.5(a), which became effective July 1, 1976, states in part:
The appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which
was not raised in the trial court. However, a party may raise the fol-
lowing claimed errors for the first time in the appellate court:
(2) failure to establish facts upon which relief can be
granted ...
The Advisory Task Force on Appellate Rules, which drafted the new
rules, prepared comments to explain the rules. While the comments were
140. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 12(h)(3) states that the court shall dismiss the action
"'[w]henever it appears ... that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter
141. 10 Wn. App. 765,520 P.2d 173(1974).
142. In its counterclaim the defendant borrower sought affirmative recovery against the plaintiff
lender because of usury. On appeal the plaintiff raised the point that the statute authorizing such relief
had not been in existence at the time of the transaction in question and that the statute was not retroac-
tive.
143. CT. APP. R. APP. 43. SuP. CT. R. APP. 1-43. in existence at that time, had a similar provi-
sion.
144. The court relied upon Hamilton v. Johnson, 137 Wash. 92, 96. 241 P. 672. 673 (1925). in
which it had been said that "if the complaint shows upon its face that the plaintiff has no cause of
action and under no circumstances can have a cause of action, the court will stay the action at the
earliest time the matter is brought to its attention.'- Also cited were State ex rel. Everett Trust & Say.
Bank v. Pacific Waxed Paper Co., 22 Wn. 2d 844, 157 P.2d 707 (1945) and State ex rel. Walton v.
Superior Court, 18 Wn. 2d 810. 140 P.2d 554 (1943).
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not adopted by the supreme court, they are useful in interpreting the rules.
The pertinent comment to Rule 2.5(a) states in part:
The rule states the general rule that the court reviews only issues
which the record shows have been argued and decided at the trial
level. . . The rule then states the exceptions to the general rule.
[Exception] . . . (2)... [has] previously been found in ROA 1-43.
... Exception (2) uses the phrase "failure to establish facts" rather
than the traditional "failure to state a claim." The former phrase
more accurately expresses the meaning of the rule in modem prac-
tice. 145
Apparently it is not appropriate to raise the contention of failure to state
a claim for the first time on appeal. It is appropriate to raise the issue of
failure to establish facts upon which relief can be granted. In effect, this is
the same thing as the contention that under the law the opposing party
cannot prevail. There is the difference, of course, that the one attack is
directed at the pleading whereas the other is directed at the evidence. It
seems, however, that the contention that one may not prevail as a matter
of law is one properly to be raised below, whether the form be a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, or for judgment on the pleadings, or
for summary judgment, or at the trial or for post-trial relief. If based upon
the failure to establish the facts at trial, the appropriate motion should be
directed at the sufficiency of the evidence and called to the attention of the
trial court. Apparently, however, the appellate rule allows the issue to be
raised for the time at the appellate level.
V. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
Perhaps the best illustration of the modem philosophy of pleading is
the approach to the amendment of pleadings. A party may amend a plead-
ing once as a matter of right any time before a responsive pleading is
served. 146 If no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, the right to amend exists within
twenty days after service.
Thereafter, amendment may take place with the written consent of the
adversary or, more likely, by leave of court. The guideline for the court is
that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires. 147
145. See comment accompanying WASH. R. APP. P. 2.5, in Vol. 0 WASH. REV. CODE (1979).
146. Violante v. White, 26 Wn. App. 391, 612 P.2d 828 (1980) (complaint for unlawful detainer
amended to request cancellation of real estate earnest money agreement, quieting of title, ejectment
and damages).
147. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(a).
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Basically, this means that after the time for right to amend has passed,
the matter rests in the discretion of the trial court, subject to review for
abuse of discretion. 148 The considerations likely to weigh most heavily
with the court are the effect upon the opponent of allowing an amendment,
whether an adverse effect can be ameliorated by the grant of a continu-
ance, the reason for the delay in seeking to assert the amended matter, the
stage of the proceedings at which the amendment is sought, the number of
previous amendments allowed, and, presumably of lesser consequence,
the effect the grant of an amendment might have in delaying or disrupting
the judicial system itself.
Within that framework, numerous cases have resulted in the allowance
of an amendment by the trial court and affirmance by the appellate
court 149 or, less frequently, allowance by the appellate court after denial
by the trial court. 150 There will, of course, be instances in which denial is
appropriate. 15 1 In the final analysis the test is to do justice, particularly in
the sense of deciding litigation on the merits rather than on pleading er-
rors. This will most often be accomplished by a liberal construction in
favor of the allowance of amendments.
The propriety of this approach is most severely tested in those instances
in which evidence is offered at the trial which is outside the issues raised
in the pleadings. If such issues are tried with the express or implied con-
sent of the parties, they are to be treated as if they had been raised in the
pleadings. 152 This assumes that there is sufficient evidence to justify an
amendment, with that determination resting in the discretion of the
court. 153 If there is such evidence, the pleadings may be amended on
148. Mullen v. North Pac. Bank, 25 Wn. App. 864, 610 P.2d 949 (1980) (denial of motion to
amend affirmed); Kiecker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 5 Wn. App. 871. 491 P.2d 244 (1971) (grant of trial
motion to amend affirmed).
149. Quackenbush v. State, 72 Wn. 2d 670, 434 P.2d 736 (1967); Sanwick v. Puget Sound Title
Ins. Co., 70 Wn, 2d 438, 423 P.2d 624 (1967); Costanzo v. Harris. 64 Wn. 2d 901. 395 P.2d 93
(1964): Raffensperger v. Towne, 59 Wn. 2d 731. 370 P.2d 593 (1962); Guyton v. Temple Motors.
Inc., 58 Wn. 2d 828, 365 P.2d 14 (1961). See also Navin v. Hall, 59 Wn. 2d 9. 365 P.2d 594 (1961).
in which plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint at the beginning of the trial was denied and then
later granted by the trial court after the plaintiff had rested his case and before the defendant's open-
ing statement. Held, that corrected any error and plaintiff could not successfully appeal because of
the "disruption of his trial strategy."
150. Pittman v. Pittman, 64 Wn. 2d 735, 393 P.2d 957 (1964); Adams v. Allstate Ins. Co.. 58
Wn. 2d 659,364 P.2d 804 (1961); Tagliani v. Colwell. 10 Wn. App. 227. 517 P 2d 207 (1973) (two
new "causes of action" allowed to be added).
151. Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Upton, 65 Wn. 2d 793, 399 P.2d 587 (1965): Morgan
Bros. v. Haskell Corp.. 24 Wn. App. 773, 604 P.2d 1294 (1979), Trust Fund Servs v. Glasscar.
Inc., 19 Wn. App. 736, 577 P.2d 980 (1978); General Indus., Inc. v. Eriksson. 2 Wn. App. 228. 467
P.2d 321 (1970).
152. WASH. SUPER. CT. Ctv. R. 15(b).
153. Balise v. Underwood, 71 Wn. 2d 331, 428 P.2d 573 (1967): Dimoff v. Ernie Majer. Inc..
55 Wn. 2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960); Carlos v. Cain, 4 Wn. App. 475. 481 P.2d 945 (1971),
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motion of a party or on the court's own motion to conform to the evi-
dence. 154 Ordinarily, the court should rule on the motion to amend at the
time it is made, though it will usually make no difference if the court
waits until the end of the trial. 15 5 The rule itself allows for the motion at
any time, even after judgment. 156
Much more commonly, there will be no formal motion to amend. In-
stead, the pleadings will simply be deemed amended to accord with what
transpired at trial. This has been the result in diverse contexts such as
evidence of a theory of recovery by the plaintiff different from that
pleaded, 157 evidence of unpleaded affirmative defenses by the defen-
dant, 158 evidence as to types and amounts of relief not set forth in the
complaint'5 9 and evidence leading to the realignment of the parties.'160
The general liberal willingness to decide the case on the basis of the proof
rather than the pleadings emphasizes once again the policy of discourag-
ing excessively formal pleading requirements. 161
Perhaps the most important considerations are that the court take care
that no party is unfairly surprised and that all understand the significance
of the evidence and have adequate opportunity to present their cases. 162 If
this is the situation and there is no objection to the evidence, it is quite
appropriate to regard this as implied consent to the trial of the unpleaded
issues. 163
Even if there is an objection, the rule directs the court to freely allow
amendment when the presentation of the merits will be subserved thereby
and when the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of the evidence will prejudice him. The rule appears to place the burden
on the objecting party with respect to the prejudice factor and further indi-
154. Fisher v. Simmons, 71 Wn. 2d 777,431 P.2d 176 (1967); MacCormack v. Robins Constr.,
I 1 Wn. App. 80, 521 P.2d 761 (1974).
155. Tacoma Commercial Bank v. Elmore, 18 Wn. App. 775, 573 P.2d 798 (1977).
156. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(b).
157. Free Methodist Church Corp. v. Brown, 66 Wn. 2d 164, 401 P.2d 655 (1965); Schutz v.
Schutz, 56 Wn. 2d 969, 354 P.2d 694 (1960); Jensen v. Ledgett, 15 Wn. App. 552, 550 P.2d 1175
(1976).
158. Amende v. Pierce County, 70 Wn. 2d 391, 423 P.2d 634 (1967); Stueckle v. Sceva Steel
Bldgs., Inc., 1 Wn. App. 391,461 P.2d 555 (1969).
159. Black v. Evergreen Land Developers, Inc., 75 Wn. 2d 241,450 P.2d 470 (1969); Fenton v.
Contemporary Dev. Co., 12 Wn. App. 345, 529 P.2d 883 (1974); Bombardi v. Pochel's Appliance
& TV Co., 9 Wn. App. 797, 515 P.2d 540 (1973); Meeker v. Howard, 7 Wn. App. 169,499 P.2d 53
(1972).
160. Harding v. Will, 81 Wn. 2d 132, 500 P.2d 91 (1972).
161. Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wn. App. 816, 572 P.2d 737 (1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 91 Wn. 2d 295,588 P.2d 233 (1978).
162. Harding v. Will, 81 Wn. 2d 132, 500 P.2d 91 (1972); O'Kelley v. Sali, 67 Wn. 2d 296,
407 P.2d 467 (1965).
163. Moar v. Beaudry, 62 Wn. 2d 98, 381 P.2d 240 (1963); Longenecker v. Brommer, 59 Wn.
2d 552, 368 P.2d 900 (1962); Jensen v. Ledgett, 15 Wn. App. 552, 550 P.2d 1175 (1976).
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cates that even if there is some initial prejudice, this may at times be
removed by granting a continuance to enable the objecting party to meet
the evidence. 164
As a matter of fact, it is necessary that the objecting party move for a
continuance in the event a trial amendment is permitted or evidence is
admitted over objection that the pleadings did not raise the issue. Failure
to so move will preclude the party from urging on appeal that the lower
court abused its discretion. 165 Assuming a continuance is sought, there
will be times when the objecting party will be deemed able and prepared
to meet the new issue, whereby a denial of the requested continuance will
not be an abuse of discretion. 166
There will, of course, be instances in which the trial court will reject
the offered evidence as being outside the pleadings. To preserve a basis
for assigning error on appeal, the proponent should seek an amendment of
the pleadings and make an offer of proof in relation to the rejected evi-
dence. 167
A peculiar problem arises when a party desires to amend a pleading
after the relevant statute of limitations has run. The rule provision is that
whenever a claim or defense asserted in the amending pleading arose out
of the same conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be
set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading. 1 68 By virtue of the relation-back doctrine the ef-
fect of the limitation period is avoided.
The rule has received a liberal construction in favor of allowing an
amendment to relate back. An excellent recent illustration is Olson v.
Roberts & Schaeffer Co. 169 The plaintiff instituted a wrongful death ac-
tion against the defendant who was alleged to be liable because of certain
statutory obligations arising as owner of the plant in which the decedent
was killed. The defendant's answer denied it was the owner and the plain-
tiff sought permission to amend the complaint to assert that the defendant
was liable because of its participation in the design and construction of
the plant. The statute of limitations had run by the time the plaintiff
sought to amend. The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion and dis-
missed her action.
The court of appeals reversed. The court noted that the defendant had
164. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(b).
165. V. C. Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma. 83 Wn. 2d 7, 514 P.2d 1381 (1973):
Burlingham-Meeker Co. v. Thomas, 58 Wn. 2d 79, 360 P.2d 1033 (1961): Waechter v. Carnation
Co., 5 Wn. App. 121.485 P.2d 1000 (1971).
166. Morgan Bros. v. Haskell Corp., 24 Wn. App. 773, 604 P.2d 1294 (1979).
167. Northwest Properties Agency, Inc. v. McGhee, I Wn. App. 305. 462 P.2d 249 (19691.
168. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(c).
169. 25Wn. App. 225,607 P.2d319(1980).
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relied upon earlier cases holding that an amendment will not relate back if
it changes the theory of the pleading or adds a cause of action. The court
said those cases no longer represent this state's rule on the relation back
of amendments. Since in this instance the plaintiff's amended complaint
involved the same occurrence as described in the original complaint and
the defendant had not shown that it would be prejudiced by the amend-
ment, the conclusion was that the trial court had abused its discretion in
denying the plaintiffs motion to amend. 170
An added problem arises when the amendment seeks to change a party.
The rule provides that an amendment changing the party against whom a
claim is asserted relates back if the same conduct, transaction or occur-
rence is involved and if, in addition, within the period provided by law
for commencing the action against him, the party to be brought in (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be
prejudiced in maintaining his defense and (2) knew or should have known
that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the
action would have been brought against him. 171 The particular provision
relating to an improper party has received the same liberal construction on
the side of allowance of relation back of an amendment as is true under
the rest of the rule. 172 It has been held, however, that a party may not be
added for relation-back purposes, if that party was originally purposefully
excluded as a product of deliberate strategy. 173
It should be noted that Civil Rule 15(c) applies only to amendments
changing the party "against whom a claim is asserted," ordinarily the
defendant. The rule does not apply to an amendment seeking to change
the party on whose behalf the action is brought. Ordinarily one would
expect the latter situation to be controlled by Civil Rule 17(a) which states
that actions shall be brought in the name of the real party in interest. That
rule also provides as follows:
170. Cf. Grant v. Morris, 7 Wn. App. 134, 498 P.2d 336 (1972) (the relation-back doctrine may
allow the assertion of different rights, but cannot alter facts occurring between the time of the original
pleading and the amendment).
171. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(c). Compare the approach before the adoption of the present
rule in DeSantis v. Angelo Merlino & Sons, Inc., 71 Wn. 2d 222, 427 P.2d 728 (1967), and Hill v.
Withers, 55 Wn. 2d 462, 348 P.2d 218 (1960).
172. See Lind v. Frick, 15 Wn. App. 614, 550 P.2d 709 (1976), which listed the requirements
for an amendment changing a party to relate back as follows: (1) the amended pleading arose out of
the transaction set forth in the original pleading; (2) the new party received notice of the action within
the statute of limitations; (3) the new party has received such notice that he will not be prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits; and (4) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.
173. Verdale Valley Citizens' Planning Comm. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 22 Wn. App.
229, 588 P.2d 750 (1978). But see G-3 Properties, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 27 Wn. App.
625, 620 P.2d 108 (1980).
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No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has
been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the
action by, orjoinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and
such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect
as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in
interest. 174
As with the other procedural rules relating to amendments, this one has
received a favorable construction with a recent case allowing amendment
of the complaint through ratification by the real party in interest after the
trial on the merits had been completed. 175
In the event a party wishes to raise matters happening after the date of
the original pleadings, a supplemental pleading should be considered. 176
Upon a motion by a party, the court may permit such a pleading to set
forth the later transactions, occurrences or events. 177 Permission may be
granted even though the original pleading was defective in its statement
of a claim or defense. 178
VI. CONCLUSION
During the past two decades of interpreting and applying the pleading
rules, the appellate courts in Washington in the great majority of instances
have kept in mind the objectives of modem pleading. The courts have
generally succeeded in avoiding the resolution of cases on the basis of
procedural technicalities and have encouraged the trial courts, the parties,
and their counsel, to get on with the business of disposing of litigation on
the merits. Such an approach encourages the efficient and economical
rendition of justice and is to be commended.
174. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 17(a). The meaning of the term "real party in interest" and the
application thereto of the relation-back doctrine is discussed in Trautman, Joinder of Claims and
Parties in Washington, 14 GONz. L. REV. 103, 108-11 (1978).
175. Fox v. Sackman, 22 Wn. App. 707, 591 P.2d 855 (1979).
176. See Bly v. Pilchuk Tribe No. 42, 5 Wn. App. 606, 489 P.2d 937 (1971).
177. See Fanning v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 59 Wn. 2d 101.366 P.2d 207 (1961).
178. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 15(d).
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